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How High is too High?  





The price elasticity of demand for microcredit is exceptionally relevant in designing 
appropriate financial products and policy. With the aim of describing consumer 
preferences, this paper extracts the loan demand schedules and elasticities of women 
borrowing from a microfinance institution in the Dominican Republic. Using client 
reactions to an increase and decrease in the standard interest rate of 400 basis points 
at 100 basis point intervals, we derive linear and constant elasticity demand functions. 
From these functions we draw a best-fit elasticity measure, and find a mean of -0.97. 
Though there is a deficit of literature modeling elasticity of demand in the field, our 
findings corroborate one recent estimate among borrowers in Bangladesh. To 
examine variation among clients, we also regress demand elasticities against 
demographic characteristics, business profile, personal financial behavior, and 
borrowing history as recorded within the partnering institution’s records. Generalized 
linear regression results indicate that clients with more savings, those with a regular 
non-remittance income source, and those with Haitian relatives exhibit significantly 
more inelastic demand. Clients who were more comfortable taking risks in order to 
increase profits, who have acquired vocational training, who consider themselves 
credit rationed, who were able to recall the interest rate on their loan, and who have 
greater monthly business sales emerged with more elastic demand. These findings 
suggest that entrepreneurial drive or skill level, financial literacy, and cultural 
dissimilarities are correlated with the price elasticity of demand for microcredit.  
 
Microfinance institutions (MFI) respond to a demand for formal credit and savings 
services among the poor and extreme poor. According to recent measurements by the 
Financial Access Initiative, 135 million adults in Latin America, or 35 percent of the 
adult population, remain outside the formal financial sphere (2009). Microcredit demand 
among these individuals has not been specified, but the estimate suggests significant 
potential for industry growth.  
 
Whether prioritizing poverty alleviation or profit-maximization, MFI success necessarily 
depends upon accurate market profiling. There is however, a shortage of literature 
modeling optimal MFI rates. Studies have traditionally placed price elasticity estimates 
among microentrepreneurs as inelastic (Kochar, 1997; Bell et al, 1997), or in other words 2 
 
have suggested that the poor and extreme poor are relatively irresponsive to interest rate 
changes. Other and more recent analyses have estimated relatively more elastic demand 
(Dehija et al, 2007) especially in the long run (Karland & Zinman, 2008), but are 
nevertheless derived from loan contract data, and as a result may generate 
disproportionately inelastic estimates where credit rationing exists.  
 
Competition in the MFI market has yet to mature and costs of managing micro-loans 
remain proportionally greater than those of managing larger loans in developed markets. 
As it stands, MFI annual interest rates vary from 20-120 percent, and appear relatively 
prohibitive aside market rates offered in more developed economies. Balancing financial 
constraints with social aims is of key concern.  
 
The aim of this paper is two-fold. Firstly, we derive price elasticity of demand estimates 
from individual loan demand information, and secondly, we regress these estimates 
against demographic characteristic, as well as borrowing, and investment behavior. If 
elasticity can be correlated with client or loan characteristics, it may identify credit 
rationed populations, or otherwise contribute to the development of more efficient policy 
and industry products. How does the consumer base shift with changes in loan pricing, 
and who may be excluded when interest rates soar? 
 
I. Country and MFI Context   
 
Though the growth of the microfinance industry in Latin America has slowed in tandem 
with the global economic downturn, it remains positive (CGAP, 2008). An index 3 
 
compiled by the Economist Intelligence Unit (2009) ranks Latin America as having the 
most attractive business environment for microfinance globally. Within the Dominican 
Republic, Honohan (2008) finds that roughly 4.5 million adults, or 71 percent of the adult 
population in 2005, did not have access to credit (FAI, 2009). This suggests prospects for 
market development. 
 
Esperanza International is a non-profit faith-based MFI targeting the extreme poor and 
especially women, in rural, semi-rural, and semi-urban communities of the Dominican 
Republic. As a Grameen Bank partner, Esperanza implements a derivative of the 
Grameen group solidarity lending model. Group loans account for roughly 96 percent of 
borrowers and 85 percent of the total loan portfolio. Clients, the majority of whom are 
women, convene on a biweekly basis with group members and an average of 5-10 other 
groups to repay loans within or in close proximity to their community of residence.  
 
Eligibility for an Esperanza loan is currently based upon an individual’s source of 
income, income level, housing and living conditions, total assets, and socio-cultural 
development level. All potential associates must have some source of income, operate a 
microenterprise, or have evident motivation to begin one. They must not, however, hold a 
fixed income higher than the national minimum salary for small businesses. On average, 
clients withdraw loans of $8900 Pesos DR or roughly $243 US for six months. Esperanza 
models optimal interest rates, offering a mean annual interest rate of 47 percent and a 





II. Empirical Strategy 
 
With a total of 13 interviewers, this study administered surveys to 431 women that held 
Esperanza group loans in July-August, 2009. Interviewers were Esperanza volunteers or 
employees, and attended a training session before implementation. Participants were 
asked for demographic, borrowing, lending, savings and investment information, and 
were also asked to respond to a series of eight demand questions (Fig. 1). In 
consideration of mean Esperanza loan characteristics, a 4 percent monthly interest rate 
and six month term were selected for the base loan model in these questions.  
 
Two treatments presented interest rates that increased or decreased sequentially by 1 
percent per month from 0 to 8 percent and 8 to 0 percent respectively, with no included 
question for the base loan rate of 4%. With each interest rate change, clients were then 
offered 10-15 loan options, all of which they were asked to acknowledge with Yes/No 
selections. These loan options correspond with elasticities of 0, -0.1, -0.2, -0.3, -0.4, -0.5, 
-0.6, -0.7, -0.8, -0.9, -1.0, -1.25, -1.5, -1.75, and -2.0. As a result, loan sizes increase from 
the base loan amount as the interest rate decreases and decrease from the base loan 
amount as the interest rate increases.  
 
To address anchoring concerns and capture a probable range of client loans, we 
administered five variants. These calculated interest rate changes according to base loan 
amounts of 3000, 6000, 9000, 12,000, or 15,000 Pesos DR, the equivalent of 85, 170, 
254, 339, or 424 US Dollars respectively. Interviewers carried multiple variants, and 5 
 
selected the loan that best matched the clients’ actual loan. Clients were asked to envision 
using the hypothetical loans for the same purpose(s) that they used or were using their 
current Esperanza loan.  
 
As compensation for their participation in the survey, clients were each offered a bundle 
valued at roughly $4.00 US that included three to four school notebooks, one tube of 
toothpaste, one small bag of laundry detergent, and one bar of soap.  
 
Esperanza branches operating in the country’s eastern provinces of El Seybo, Hato 
Mayor, and San Pedro de Macoris, as well as a branch operating in the northern province 
of Puerto Plata, and the branches serving Los Alcarrizos and Los Guaricanos 
communities within the capital district were selected for the study. Due to interviewing 
inconsistencies, surveys from Puerto Plata are not included in this analysis. Of 
participants from the remaining five branches, 232 provided complete credit demand 
responses for each interest rate change and can be linked to client information in 
Esperanza’s database.  
 
III. Demand & Elasticity Measures 
 
Where a client has chosen a series of loans and makes only one switch from yes to no, we 
have used the average of the elasticities that correspond to the loan and next unselected 
loan to calculate a final loan size. In cases where clients have selected “yes” for all loans, 
the maximum loan amount has been included in the demand analysis. In cases where 
clients have marked “no” to all loan options, we have incorporated a loan size of zero 6 
 
into the analysis. Where clients have selected multiple non-sequential loans, we have 
included only the loan where they have made their first switch. 
 
Credit demand curves have been constructed for each client and as theory predicts, slope 
downwards (Figure 2). That is, demand for credit generally increases as the interest rates 
decreases towards zero. With the raw demand data we derive linear and constant 
elasticity demand functions, from which we extract respective elasticity measurements at 
the base loan size and interest rate. We evaluate r
2 values in each instance, and select a 
best-fit function for each client. Selections made at the intercept, i = 0 percent, are 
excluded from the calculations. Using these selection criteria, linear demand estimations 
comprise 96 percent of the best-fit measures. The distribution of constant, linear and best-
fit elasticities (Figure 3) indicates that roughly 50 percent of linear demand estimates 
emerge as elastic, having values less than or equal to -1. On the other hand, 30 percent of 
power function constant elasticity calculations carry elastic values of less than or       
equal to -1.  
 
Consistent with linear demand curvature, the majority of elasticity observations become 
more elastic as the interest rate decreases, and less elastic as the interest rate increases 
(Fig. 4). Some clients display differing preferences (Fig. 5, Fig. 6). Finally we estimate a 
mean best-fit elasticity of -0.97 (Table 4).  
 
Bearing in mind the limitations of fitted demand functions, we also consider Arc 
elasticities. These measure the stepwise elasticities at the midpoint between loan 
selections in a given clients’ demand schedule. The means of these Arc elasticities also 7 
 
show that elasticity increases in the upper interest rate range and decreases in the lower 
range (Table 2). The means of the elasticities selected by clients scale from elastic in the 
lower interest rate range to inelastic in the upper interest rate range.  
 
Rough calculations indicate that Esperanza would not gain interest revenue within the 
sample by changing interest rates.  
 
IV. Regression Results  
 
Estimates are derived from a Generalized Linear Model that utilizes a robust 
heteroscedasticity-correcting Maximum Likelihood function (Fig. 7). 
 
a. Demographic 
Among demographic variables, clients who held vocational training emerged with 
significantly more elastic demand than clients who did not (p<0.10). Clients who 
reported having Haitian relatives emerge with significantly more inelastic demand 
(p<0.05). Clients who drew the majority of their income from their own business 
earnings (p<0.05)  or from wage labor (p<0.1) show significantly more inelastic demand 
than clients who gathered the majority of their income from remittances or who did not 
have a regular income source. Neither religiousity nor a measurement of community 





b. Loan Characteristics 
The clients' actual loan size, installment, effective interest rate and amount placed into a 
voluntary savings account during the course of the loan did not emerge as significant.  
 
c. Business Characteristics 
Clients who reported monthly sales of zero to 5000 Pesos DR emerged with more 
inelastic demand than clients that were still in the midst of establishing their business and 
could not yet claim regular sales (p<0.05). Against this same group, clients who reported 
sales of more than 20000 Pesos DR emerged with the most elastic demand (p<0.10)  
 
d. Borrowing Behavior 
Neither the sum of Esperanza loans disbursed prior to the survey, nor the sum of 
Esperanza loans disbursed in the six months following the survey, emerged as significant 
variables. The number of loans that participants received from banks or NGO prior to the 
survey was also insignificant. Clients who reported that they had at least once been late to 
repay a loan to a family member, friend, moneylender or formal financial institution did 
not emerge as significantly different in the model.  
 
Clients who considered themselves credit rationed with regards to consumption, correlate 
with more inelastic demand (p<0.1). Clients who considered themselves credit rationed 
with regards to their business also exhibit significantly more inelastic demand (p<0.5). 
Clients who reported that they were more likely to take risks in order to increase profit 
carried significantly more elastic demand (p<0.01). Clients that were familiar enough 9 
 
with the concept of an interest rate to give any response regarding the rate on their current 
loan, emerged with significantly more inelastic demand (p<0.5). 
 
When asked  how they would respond if the interest rate on their loan increased, clients 
who would take out a smaller loan emerged with less elastic demand than clients who 
would  nevertheless take out more or who did not know (p<0.10). Measured against the 
same group, clients who responded that they would take out the same sized loan emerged 
with significantly more inelastic demand (p<0.05). When asked how they would respond 
if the interest rate on their loan decreased, clients who would take out a larger loan 
emerged with significantly more elastic demand than those that would  take out the same 
loan, a smaller loan, or did not know (p<0.001).   
 
e. Savings 
Clients who reported an accumulated savings of 500 to 1000 Pesos DR emerged with 
significantly more elastic demand than those with a greater amount of savings (p<0.05).  
 
f. Survey  
Experimental treatments and variation emerged as significant. Clients who were 
administered a treatment where interest rates were presented from 8 percent to 0 percent 
emerged with significantly more inelastic demand than those who were administered a 
treatment which presented interest rates as increasing from 0 percent to 8 percent (p<0.1). 
Clients who were administered the survey immediately following a bank meeting were 
correlated with significantly more inelastic demand (p<0.05). 
 10 
 
The difference in size between the clients' actual loans and the variant loans emerged as 
significant (p<0.5), but with little effect on the variation of elasticity. Clients from the 
Seybo branch carried significantly more elastic demand than those from Hato Mayor 
(p<0.05), San Pedro de Macoris (p<0.01), and from the Alcarrizos (p<0.1). An 
interviewer is significantly correlated with inelastic demand among clients (p<0.5). 
Clients that responded “no” to all loans for any loan demand question emerged with 
significantly more elastic demand (p<0.001) than those who did not.  
 
V. Discussion  
 
In our sample, client demand approaches unit-elasticity. Our mean elasticity estimate 
falls within the range defined by Dehejia et al (2007) of  -0.73 to -1.04 and contrasts Bell 
et al.’s (1997) measure of -0.22 among small scale farmers in Punjab, India.  
 
Variables that may relate to entrepreneurial drive and skill-level emerge with a positive 
correlation to elasticity. Vocational training, monthly business sales, and decreased risk 
aversion all seem to indicate elastic demand.  
 
Alternatively, variables that could feasibly correlate with financial literacy emerge as 
inversely correlated with elasticity. These are an ability to name the interest rate on the 
client’s Esperanza loan, the accumulation of savings, income stability, perceived debt 
level, and perceived degree of credit rationing.  
 11 
 
Our findings link greater savings levels with more inelastic demand. This supports 
Dehejia et al’s (2007) elasticity estimate of -0.86 for a “low-saving” group, and -0.26 for 
a “high-saving” group. Savings in this case was measured as the amount of voluntary 
savings that the client set aside over the course of their loan. Interestingly, the same 
voluntary savings variable did not surface as statistically different from zero or with a 
non-zero coefficient in our model.  
 
Income stability may also play into a theory of financial literacy. The model suggests that 
clients who depend primarily on business and wage-labor income, in place of 
remittances, have more inelastic demand. It may be that such clients are more likely to 
anchor at specific loan amounts that correspond with perceived limitations or specific 
loan purposes.  
 
Perceived credit rationing serves as an indicator of client demand for credit, and in that 
sense ties in with questions of financial fluency. It may be that individuals who perceive 
that they are more credit rationed have a higher demand for credit than those who do not 
report credit rationing. Finally, this line of reasoning may explain the relative inelasticity 
of clients who were administered the survey immediately following a bank meeting. 
Having just paid a quota of their loan, these clients may have been more immediately 
conscious of their business goals and debt.  
 
We find that Dominican-Haitians exhibit significantly more inelastic demand for credit. 
This may be a result of credit rationing. Dominican Haitians comprise what are relatively 
the most impoverished communities in the Dominican Republic, commonly living 12 
 
isolated in relic sugarcane producing communities. All surveyed clients were fluent in 
Spanish, but Haitian cultural ties may in some way limit investment or financial 
opportunities.  
 
Questions meant to gauge basic responses to interest rate changes are significant and 
consistent with expectations. Clients who were administered Treatment A emerged with 
significantly more inelastic demand than those who were administered Treatment B. 
Treatment A began by proposing loans with 8 percent monthly interest. It is possible that 
considering higher rates at the start seasoned the client’s responses to the questions that 
followed. There is no clear explanation for variation between branches.  
 
Clients who selected “no” for all loan options in any one of the eight demand questions, 
are correlated with more elastic demand. Coding these responses with loan sizes of zero 
may excessively skew elasticity estimates, and consequently call for the calculation of 




Preliminary results suggest that women microentrepreneurs who have already entered the 
MFI market have close to unit elastic demand for microcredit. More plainly, the 
percentage change in a given interest rate is met by nearly the same percentage change in 
the quantity demanded.  Measurements of variation within the sample do not significantly 
or explicitly correlate finer poverty indicators with elasticity. Furthermore, rough 13 
 
estimates suggest that interest rate changes would not benefit Esperanza in terms of 
revenue within this limited sample. 
 
Before competition and efficiency gains in the microfinance industry drive interest rates 
downwards, a large proportion of borrowers will remain credit rationed. Where does 
policy move from there? With short-term subsidies targeted at women borrowers for 
instance, some argue that MFI could lower their interest rates, increase their capital base, 
grow to a larger scale, and more sustainably serve a larger number of clients. However, 
credit subsidies in the agricultural and rural realms have not been historically successful 
(Adams & Von Pischke, 1992). Appropriate policy responses will require more thorough 
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Interviewer: All of the following questions ask the client to respond supposing that they have a loan of 6000 
Pesos DR for 6 Months. 
1)  Suppose that you have received a loan of 6000 Pesos DR for 6 months. Now suppose that the interest rate 
increased from 4 percent to 8 percent per month, or 96 percent annual. This means that you would pay 
roughly 120 Pesos MORE per quota. With this interest rate, and using the money for exactly what you 
indicated earlier, which of the following loans would you want, if you could recieve which ever you desired? 











YES  NO 
A   $6,000   $649   $1848     
B   $5,400   $585   $1661     
C   $4,800   $520   $1477     
D   $4,200   $455   $1292     
E   $3,600   $390   $1108     
F   $3,000   $325   $924     
G   $2,400   $260   $737     
H   $1,800   $195   $553     
I   $1,200   $130   $368     
J   $600   $65   $184     
Figure 1. Demand Supplement, English translation of a sample question. Letters A-J correspond 
with elasticity of zero through -2.  
 
 










Figure 3. Cumulative counts of point elasticity estimates for linear 
function, constant elasticity power function, and ‘best’ elasticity based 
on greatest r
2. Notes: The count is lower for the constant elasticity measure, as 
entries with loan amounts of zero at the intercept could not be incorporated into 





Figure 4. Elasticity Sample, elastic where i > 4percent. Elasticity at 








Figure 5. Elasticity Sample, elastic where i < 4percent. Elasticity at 








Figure 6. Elasticity Sample, inelastic and constant range. Elasticity 










Figure 7. Generalized Linear Model (GLM), the GLM procedure is based on a Robust – 
Heteroskedasticity Correcting Maximum Likelihood function. Excluded Dummy Variables: Income 
Source Remittances or Not Regular, Commerce, Monthly Sales NA, Annual Savings >10%, Accumulated 
Savings >1000 Pesos RD, Treatment B, Seybo, Miguelina, Reina, Mirna, Astia, Maximo,  
Classification  Variable  GLM 
Coefficient 
Wald P 
       
Dependent:  Elasticity of Demand for Credit, Absolute Value     
       
  (Intercept)  .980  .001 
 
Demographic  Age  .001  .625 
  Education  .021  .420 
  Vocational Training *  .116  .073 
  Dependents, Elementary  -.017  .246 
  Water, Access  -.026  .358 
  Haitian Relatives**  -.193  .031 
  Income Source, Own Business  -.154  .090 
  Income Source, Paid Work**  -.291  .011 
  Religious Rating  -.005  .643 
  Community Involvement  .012  .602 
 
Loan Characteristics  Amount Disbursed  .000  .773 
  Installment  .000  .251 
  Effective Interest Rate  .003  .193 
  Voluntary Savings  .000  .756 
  Esperanza Health Services  -.020  .794 
 
Business Characteristics  Industry  -.026  .814 
Service  .129  .144 
Agriculture  -.015  .865 
Loan, Quasi-Fixed Investment  .028  .611 
Monthly Sales, 0-5000 Pesos DR**  -.181  .030 
Monthly Sales, 5000-10000 Pesos DR  .122  .214 
Monthly Sales, 10000-15000 Pesos DR  .050  .579 
Monthly Sales, 15000-20000 Pesos DR  .052  .592 
Monthly Sales, 20000 or more Pesos DR*  .209  .070 
 
Borrowing Behavior  Loans Obtained After  Survey, Sum Pesos DR  .000  .252 
  Loans Obtained Prior to Survey, Sum Pesos DR  .000  .828 
  Loans Received Prior to Survey, Number  -.005  .315 
  Loan Paid Late  -.036  .573 
  Debt Scale  -.020  .683 
  Rationing, Esperanza  .000  .985 
  Credit Necessary to Purchase Sufficient Food  -.036  .472 
  Rationing, None Perceived wrt. Consumption***  -.049  .002 
  Rationing, None Perceived wrt. Production **  -.034  .034 
  Willingness to Take Risks**  .030  .046 
  Interest Rate Aware**  -.121  .030 
  Increase Rate, Borrow the Same *  -.134  .058 
  Increase Rate, Borrow More **  -.156  .020 
  Decreased Rate, Borrow More ***  .312  .000 
 
Savings  Annual Savings, 0-5percent  -.043  .608 
  Annual Savings, 5-10percent  -.005  .895 
  Accumulated Savings, 0-500 Pesos DR  -.032  .629 
  Accumulated Savings, 500-1000 Pesos DR*  .121  .032 
 
Survey Characteristics  Treatment A, Interest rate in Descending Order*  -.100  .051 
  Survey, Immediately Following Bank Meeting**  -.181  .033 
  Variant – Actual Loan, Difference*  .000  .067 
  Hato Mayor**  -.263  .017 
  San Pedro de Macoris ***  -.258  .008 
  Los Alcarrizos *  -.232  .091 
  Los Guaricanos  -.042  .808 
  Lourdes  -.086  .418 
  Gabriela*  -.224  .014 
  Yrene  -.226  .139 
  Time between Surveys  .002  .684 
  Responses Include “none”***  .659  .000 
  (Scale)  .072












Table 1. Characteristics of Esperanza Loans 
Variable  Mean  Standard Deviation 
Interest Rate, Annual 
Effective Interest Rate, Annual 
Installment, Days 
Amount disbursed, Pesos DR 
46.85  4.156 
66.586  6.6868 
185.63  107.841 
8876.60  16623.468 






Table 2. Elasiticity Responses 
Interest Rate  0%  1%  2%  3%  4%  5%  6%  7%  8% 
Mean                    
Selected Elasticity   -1.31  -1.23  -1.10  -0.80  NA  -0.72  -0.70  -0.58  -0.51 
Interest Rate Range    0-1%  1-2%  2-3%  3-4%  4-5%  5-6%  6-7%  7-8% 
Mean                   
Arc-Elasticity    -0.09  -0.30  -0.60  -0.59  -0.98  -1.35  -1.32  -1.59 
Notes: Selected elasticities refer to those that correspond directly with loan selections in the Demand 





































  Response  N  Percentage    Response  N  Percentage 





9  4.6  Loan Purpose  Production 
Input(s) 
23  11.7 
High School  44  22.3    Merchandise  174  88.3 
Middle School  63  32.0  Late Loan 
Repayment 
Yes  46  23.4 
Elementary  71  36.0  No  151  76.6 
Illiterate  10  5.1  Other Debt 
when surveyed 
Yes  66  33.5 
Vocational 
Training 
Yes  140  71.1  No  131  66.5 
No  57  28.9  Business Sector  Industry  8  4.1 
Haitian Origen 
or Relatives 
Yes  28  14.2    Service  15  7.6 
No  169  85.8    Agriculture  16  8.1 
Dependents in 
School 
Yes  157  79.7    Commerce  158  80.2 
No  40  20.3  Branch  San Pedro de 
Macoris 




Yes  161  81.7  Seybo  80  40.6 
  No  36  18.3 
 






> 10percent  28  14.2  Alcarrizos  11  5.6 
5-10percent  74  37.6    Guaricanos  7  3.6 
< 5percent  88  44.7  Interviewer  Lourdes  16  8.1 






Yes  69  35.0    Yrene  9  4.6 
No  128  65.0 
 






Do Not Know  1  .5  Survey Location  Meeting  15  7.6 
Same Loan  28  14.2    Home  182  92.4 
Smaller Loan  7  3.6  Treatment  A  124  62.9 




Do Not Know  13  6.6         
Same Loan  80  40.6         
Smaller Loan  88  44.7         
Larger Loan  14  7.1         
               
               21 
 
Table 4. Continuous Variables 
  Mean  Standard Deviation 
 
Loan Profile 
   
Best Elasticity Estimate  -0.97  -0.48 
Loan Variant and Actual Loan, Difference  2809.64  5999.62 
Loan Amount , Pesos DR  11746.19  7004.12 
Installment, Days  188.25  59.20 
Voluntary Savings, Pesos DR  41.39  25.47 
Effective Interest Rate, Annual  64.65  9.74 
Sum of Prior Esperanza Loans, Pesos DR  30285.09  26574.37 
Number of Loans Received from a Bank or NGO  5.81  4.03 
 
Client Profile 
   
Age when surveyed, Years  40  13 
Dependents in Elementary School  1.57  1.50 
Religiousity, Scale of 1-8  5.62  2.28 
Debt Scale, Scale of 1-3  1.67  0.54 
Water Access, Scale of 1-3  2.15  0.90 
Willingness to Accept Risk, Scale 1-5  4.02  1.66 
Credit Rationing wrt. Consumption, 
Scale 1(rationed)–5(not rationed) 
1.67  1.33 
Credit Rationing wrt. Production, 
Scale 1(rationed)–5(not rationed) 
4.30  1.39 
Education, Scale 1(illiterate)-5(Technical 
Institute) 
2.85  0.98 
 
Survey Characteristics 
   
Time between Cornell and Esperanza Surveys, 
Months 








Table 5. Change in Interest Revenue according to Loan Selections 
  Interest,  Monthly 
  0percent  1percent  2percent  3percent  5percent  6percent  7percent  8percent 
Revenue, Pesos DR                 
Monthly 
Mean  ($2,425)  ($1,368)  ($641)  ($243)  ($450)  ($351)  ($363)  ($247) 
Total  ($562,503)  ($317,269)  ($148,772)  ($56,423)  ($104,461)  ($81,399)  ($84,315)  ($57,275) 
                   
Loan Term 
Mean  ($14,547)  ($8,205)  ($3,848)  ($1,459)  ($2,702)  ($2,105)  ($2,181)  ($1,481) 
Total  ($3,375,018)  ($1,903,617)  ($892,629)  ($338,539)  ($626,768)  ($488,391)  ($505,892)  ($343,652) 
                   
Notes:  Estimates compound interest on a biweekly basis and are measured according to variant 
base loan. N=243, all values are negative. 
 
 
 
 
 
 